In this paper we take advantage of a unique micro-database on forward trading in the international petroleum market, with information on the buyer and seller in each transaction. We utilize transaction-specific data to test directly predictions from the theory of normal backwardation vs. information-based predictions of who profits in these markets.
INFORMATION AND NORMAL BACKWARDATION AS DEr'IRMlNANTS OF TRADING PERFORMANCE:
Evidence from the North-Sea Oil Forward MarKet Resolution of the longstanding debate over who gains and who loses in financial markets requires data at a disaggregated level. In this paper we take advantage of a unique database with information on the buyer "and seller in each transaction in a forward market to measure trading performance. Our tests are designed to shed light on the potential sources of differential returns to participants in forward and futures markets. We examine trading performance to assess the empirical relevance of two potential sources of differential returns: insurance and information.
Behind the insurance view is the theory of "normal backwardation," dating back to 'eynes (1930) and Hicks (1946) . The theory treats these markets as arenas wherein risk-averse "hedgers," firms that produce or utilise the physical commodity, purchase insurance from "speculators," who do not. Until the 1980s, the bulk of the research literature on forward and futures markets was based on the normalbackwardation assumption (see, e.g., Kawai 1983) .1 An alternative (but not mutually exclusive) explanation of trader performance is based on information. That differential information can affect prices and profits in financial markets has been demonstrated formally in recent research (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz 1980, Kyle 1985) . A literature has developed based on asymmetrically-informed market participants, with the less-informed referred to as "noise traders."Z 1The literature outside this tradition (e.g., Telser and Higginbotham 1977 , Telser 1981 , Williams 1987 , in contrast, is relatively fragmented and sparse.
2Shleifer and Summers (1990) provide an overview of this literature.
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The classic theory of normal backwardation yields the testable hypothesis that, on average, speculators should gain and hedgers should lose in these markets. More recently, a literature based on portfolio theory (e.g., the Capital Asset Pricing Model) has pointed out that the traditional normal-backwardation approach implicitly assumes that claims on hedgers' profits (e.g.; equity) cannot be marketed costlessly. Models based on the opposite assumption--that forward and futures markets are perfectly integrated with markets for other assets--yield the conclusion that risk premia are not related to hedging, because speculators can costlessly enter futures and forward markets, and diversify the nonsystematic risk assumed in these markets by combining them in portfolios with other assets. 3 Hirshleifer (1988) integrates the traditional theories of risk premia based on hedging with the portfolio approach, demonstrating that nonmarketability of claims on profits, together with fixed costs of entering asset markets, yield predictions similar to those of the simple normal-backwardation model. Bessembinder (1992) uses monthly aggregate data from a variety of futures markets to test these predictions against those of the portfolio approach. He finds support for Hirshleifer's modern version of the normal-backwardation model, in that net hedging, interacted with residual risk, is associated with returns in futures markets.
In contrast, the asymmetric-information view of trader performance predicts that traders with better information will gain at the expense of uninformed or "noise" traders. Thus, if traders who operate in the cash (physicals) market have superior information about future supply and demand conditions, the prediction of the normal-backwardation model can be reversed. 30usak (1973) was the first to attempt to relate returns on futures contracts and the systematic risk emphasized in portfolio theory, finding no significant relationship.
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Typically, though, the only data that are publicly available are prices and market volumes; thus, transactions by hedgers and speculators have not been distinguished. Faced with this obstacle, economists have fallen back on attempting to detect risk premia in price data, as evidence of the insurance fees predicted by normal backwardatiun. In contrast,. our information on the parties to and terms of each trade allows a direct test of the role of these two potential sources of differential trading performance. We construct trading accounts for each type of company in the database, and use these accounts to test whether hedgers lose and speculators gain in this market.
Recent papers by Hartzmark (1987 Hartzmark ( ,1991 are the only other attempt to utilise information on individual traders to test whether on average speculators gain and hedgers lose in these markets. Hartzmark's data, disaggregated by individual trader rather than individual trade, do not support the normal-backwardation theory.4 In contrast, empirical studies based on aggregate data have found support for the normal backwardation theory (e.g., Chang 1985).5 These studies, like Hartzmark's, were obliged to rely on data from U.S. markets, as well as on the arbitrary definition of "large" used by the U.S. Conunodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).6 4Utilising end-of-day position data in nine futures markets. Hartzmark finds that large hedgers actually make significantly positive (at the 5% level) returns overall. while large speculators' returns differed insignificantly from zero. Large hedgers' returns were positive in eight of the nine markets.
5Hartzmark (1987.1991) are the only papers employing disaggregated data. The pioneering paper by Houthakker (1957) . as well as the very few other empirical studies in this literature (e.g .• Bessembinder 1992; see Hartzmark 1987 for citations) have relied on data that were highly aggregated over traders. time. or both. 6The data used in previous studies come from the CFTC, which requires "large traders" (the threshold number of contracts for "large" depends on the conmodity) to report their positions daily. and to identify these positions as "commercial" (i.e .
• there were offsetting commitments in the cash market) or non-commercial (no offsetting commitments). Below the regulatory threshold. traders are considered "sma"" and are not required to report their positions to the CFTC. A given firm can change categories based on its behaviour in a given month, or on the periodic changes in the thresholds. In the aggregate studies. as well as Hartzmark's. small traders are treated as a residual. and assumed to be speculators. As futures trading is a zero-sum game. Hartzmark's results imply that DETERMINANTS OF TRADING P~FORMANCE, page 4 This paper undertakes transaction-based tests in a very different arena--the international forward market for petroleum. The microdata we use have two important advantages for testing hypotheses about winners and losers in financial markets. First, as noted above, our information pertains to each individual transaction, rather than just end-of-day position data~all that has been available to previous researchers. Thus we are able to examine intraday trading.
Second, the data indicate the~of companies involved in each transaction.
These types (discussed further below) conform more closely to intuitive notions of speculators and hedgers than the arbitrary CFTC dichotomies of large vs. small and commercial vs. non-commercial positions upon which previous studies have been forced to rely.7
The petroleum forward market is organised quite differently from a futures market.
All trading is bilateral; there is no clearinghouse, no open outcry, no centralised exchange. 8 Only at the end of the trading day is information on deals negotiated during the day widely disseminated. During the day, traders must rely on their contacts for information on the transactions consummated. 9 We take small participants made significant losses in these markets. 7Moreover, our types are defined by firms' long-run position in the industry, and not by their trading behaviour in a particular month. Of course. firms that produce and/or consume a good often engage in speculation as well. While it is impossible to be certain when a company that produces or consumes a good is hedging or speculating without knowing its future commitments in the cash (physicals) market at the time, such firms differ fundamentally from those that neither produce nor consume the good; the latter can profit only by on average selling relatively high and/or buying relatively low.
8Transactions are consummated via teiephone and telex; the terms are not public knowledge. All the data on this market are obtained by survey by firms that specialise in information collection and dissemination; one of these firms, Petroleum Argus, maintains the historical microdatabase used in this study. Detailed information on the market can be found in Mabro et al (1986) , Sas (1987a,b) , and Weiner (1989) .
9Subscribers to the services of the survey companies in this market receive an electronic report at the end of each trading day that includes individual transactions consummated that day. During the day, periodic price "assessments," in the form of bid/ask quotes, are sent out by the various survey companies, but these quotes are not necessarily based on actual transactions. DETERMINANTS OF TRADIN~PERFORMANCE, page 5 advantage of the timing of information dissemination in this market to identify intraday performance with asymmetric information, and interday performance with the risk premia associated with normal backwardation.
The decentralised nature of this market allows us to· isolate the role of asymmetric information as a determinant of trader performance. Unlike futures markets, price and quantity data here are not instantaneously available to market participants. Thus, to the extent that models of asymmetric information are relevant in understanding financial markets, they ought to receive empirical support here.
This setting should also be better suited than a futures market for testing the prediction of the normal-backwardation model regarding risk premia. 10 As discussed below, entry into this forward market is far more costly than in futures markets.
Individual investors cannot participate in the forward market, unless they are willing to participate in the physicals market as well.
Thus risk premia need not be competed away by an infinitely elastic supply of speculators. Failure to detect evidence of risk premia here would constitute stronger evidence against normal backwardation than it would in a futures market, where entry is relatively easy. This is important because the absence of free entry into speculation implies that the risk premia predicted by the theory of normal backwardation need not be driven to zero. ll Thus if normal backwardation laThe substantial price fluctuations in the underlying commodity, crude oil, should also serve to make this market a good laboratory for empirical research on risk premia. 11See the discussion above and Hirsh1eifer (1988) . DETERMINANTS OF TRADING P£RfORMANCE, page 6 drives results in commodity markets, it should be more easily detectable here than in futures markets, where entry by small-scale speculators is relatively easy.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II discusses market institutions and the database. The methodology for estimation· of traders' gains and losses is presented in Section III. Empirical results are reported in Sections IV and V for the interday accounts, and Section VI for the intraday accounts. Section VII offers some conclusions.
II. The Brent Forward Market: Organisation and Data
The commodity traded is Brent Blend crude oil, a type of crude oil produced in the North Sea, which is one of the largest oil-producing areas in the world. The "Brent market" combines aspects of forward and futures contracting. As regards the former, all transactions are entered into bilaterally (in the absence of an exchange or clearinghouse), no margins are put up, and entering into an agreement requires the ability to take or make delivery should that be necessary (i.e., entering into an offsetting contract does not confer the right to automatic cash settlement). Contracts are governed by U.K. commercial law, but are denominated in U.S. dollars, the currency for virtually all international trade in crude oil.
Despite these characteristics of forward markets, the Brent market is primarily one of financial transactions--a feature usually associated with futures trading.
Although no automatic right to financial settlement exists, over 90% of all contracts are settled financially, rather than through delivery.12 Contracts are 12Financial settlement before contract maturity is referred to in this market as "booking out." In the absence of a clearinghouse, trading is not anonymous, so it necessary to keep track of the parties that have made commitments for future purchase and delivery. DETERMINANTS OF TRADING P~FORMANCE, page 7 standardised, as in a futures market, with all contract terms, save price, preestablished. 13 In addition, formal futures trading of Brent contracts was successfully introduced by the International Petroleum Exchange in July 1988. 14 Each record in the database represents a transaction, containing the date, contract maturity, type of buyer, type of seller, and price. As part of the agreement between the survey company and the respondents, individual trader records are not disclosed, but rather aggregated by type. Thus we will be unable to detect heterogeneity of trader performance within a given type. 1S Table 1 summarises the trader types, and indicates their relative size in terms of numbers of reported transactions.
13Contract size is standardised at 500,000 barrels (600,000 barrels from 1985 through July 1988). roughly one tanker cargo. and delivery point at Sullom Voe, the Shetland Islands. Forward contracts in this market have the same maturity structure as futures contracts; maturity is for a given month in the future (not for a given number of days in the future. as in the forward market for foreign exchange), and ranges from zero (spot transactions) to 5-6 months, with the bulk of trading for 1-3 months forward. There are no price-move or position limits. 14Crude oil futures trading has been active since its reintroduction by the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) in early 1983, and covers the period of our database, July 1983 through the end of 1989. In volume terms, the Brent forward market was about 15% of the size of the futures market during this period. The type of crude oil traded on the NYHEX is known as West Texas Intermediate (WTI). Crude oil is not a homogeneous commodity, and the many types of crude oil are imperfect substitutes, varying in how much gasoline, fuel oil, and other petroleum products they yield when refined. Price movements are imperfectly correlated across crude oil types. in part because demand shocks (e.g., weather, coal strikes, air travel demand) tend to be specific to refined petroleum products.
ISTwo questions of data reliability arise when using survey information: 1) sample representativeness, and 2) respondents' incentives to reply truthfully. Neither is likely to be a serious problem here. The market is small enough, and reputation important enough, that whom to survey is not an issue. The survey is carried out every business day. and tries to reach all buyers and sellers in the market. rather than a sample of them. Only transactions verified by both buyer and seller are registered. A check of the effectiveness of the procedure reported in Habra et al (1986) estimated that the survey succeeded in registering roughly two-thirds of all transactions. The quality of the data is sufficiently high that the prices reported are very widely used in the petroleum industry as a basis for price-setting in long-term sales contracts for other types of crude oil (Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 1989) . Trader reluctance to admit to having made a very good or a very poor bargain could bias our tests regarding "search account," profitability (described below) toward the null. III.
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The Trading Accounts
We construct two different accounts for each type of company, based on these individual transactions, in order to test for differential performance, and to determine the source of any performance differentials found. In-addition, we conduct non-parametric tests of forecasting ability developed by Merton (1981) and Henriksson and Merton (1981) .
We first construct an account that measures interday performance, which we term the holding account. The holding account captures the profits that traders make on a given day on their open positions, based on price movements for the relevant contracts, and parallels the accounts constructed by earlier researchers in not relying on individual-transaction data. 16 The normal backwardation hypothesis predicts holding-account profits for speculators and losses for hedgers, given the non-marketable risks combined with transactions costs associated with participating in the market discussed above.
In contrast, the asymmetric-information theory would predict neither gains nor losses for any trader-type on the holding account, given the pattern of information dissemination in this market (see text and footnote 9 above), provided that traders had similar access to information about events other than the terms of deals consummated privately in this market.
Next we construct an account that measures intraday performance, which we term the search account. The search account captures traders ability to make (or to 160ur holding-account calculations are thus subject to the same limitations as the previous literature in the area of determining trader profitability in financial markets--profits and losses on positions held for less than one trading day will not register.
DETERMINANTS OF TRADING PERfeRMANCE, page 10 time) "good deals," measured as the amount above the daily mean (for the relevant contract maturity) a seller obtained, or the amount below the daily mean a buyer paid on each transaction. Again given the pattern of information dissemination in this market, the asymmetric-information theory would predict that traders with superior information would register gains on the search account.
A. Holding Account
Our method of construction is the same as previous authors', except for the prices that we use as the basis for posting gains and losses. In the absence of an .
exchange, there is no closing price for each forward contract. The choices available to us to proxy for the unobserved closing forward prices are 1) the closing prices for the corresponding futures contracts on the New York Mercantile Exchange; 2) the closing spot price; and 3) the average of the forward prices for each maturity.
The calculations reported below use the closing futures prices. I7 Use of futures prices introduces noise into the estimation of traders' performance because of the imperfect correlation between prices of the types of crude oil traded on the forward and futures markets. 18
17 In addition, the accounts were constructed using end-of-day spot prices, which effectively assumes away basis risk between spot and forward contracts. The last measure, the average of forward prices for each maturity, is not utilised because these prices reflect the ability of the transacting parties to seek out favorable terms of trade in a market without centralised trading. This aspect of trading performance is discussed further below.
18Although the two types of crude oil are quite similar, their prices do not move in lock-step together, due to transport costs in combination with local supply and demand effects (see footnote 14 above), and to differences in the timing of price reporting. The correlation between daily returns (measured in the usual manner as the logarithm of price changes) on the nearby NYMEX futures contract and the assessment (see footnote 9 above) for the nearby Brent forward contract over the period 1988-1991 was 0.745. Crude oil futures trading on the NYHEX halts at 3:10 PM Eastern time. Since forward trading is informal, it could in principle take place around the clock. In practice, the westernmost oil trading center is Houston, and the end-of-day survey reports are issued at 5 PH
Gains and losses calculated using closing futures prices were then cumulated over time to produce figures comparable to previous studies. The holding account measures profits associated with open pos~tions at the end of each trading day.
The account reflects, inter alia, market participants' ability to forecast price changes from one day to the next, given the information available to them. In equation form, the holding account for the jth trader-type on day t, H jt , is:
where m is contract maturity, p is the price for a contract of maturity m, and Q is the trader-type's open interest in contracts of maturity m at the close of the preceding business day.19 Short positions are characterised by Q<O, so that traders who are short make money on the holding account when prices fall. Of course, the sum across traders of profits is zero each day <Lj H jt = 0 for all t).
B. Tests of Forecasting Ability
The holding account can record gains or losses that are statistically significant, even if a trader-type lacks forecasting ability. If futures prices rise (respectively, fall) over a given period, then traders who tend to be long for commercial reasons, e.g. refiners (respectively, short, e.g. producers), will post significant gains, even in the absence of forecasting ability, as long as price changes are not completely anticipated. 2o
Houston time (6 PM Eastern time; Petroleum Argus, communication). Exchange-rate movements are not an issue. since as noted above, both contracts are denominated in U.S. dollars.
19When spot prices are used to construct the accounts, the right-hand-side of (1) 
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The difference between posting holding-account gains and exhibiting forecasting ability corresponds to the difference between the unconditional probability of being on the "right side of the market" (long when prices are rising, short when they are falling) and conditional probability of being on the right side of the market, given that prices are rising or falling.
We adapt methods for assessing market-timing performance developed by Merton (1981) , Henriksson and Merton (1981) , and Cumby and Modest (1987) , and applied to futures markets by Chang (1985) and Hartzmark (1991) . 21 ZlMerton (1981) demonstrates that a necessary condition for forecasting ability (interpreted in our context) is that the conditional probabilities of being on the right side of the market, given a price increase and a price decrease respectively, must sum to more than one. A producer. e.g., whose position is always short, is on the right side of the market with probability one when prices decline, but on the right side with probability zero when they rise, and thus would exhibit no forecasting ability. See references for further details. If a trader-type has forecasting ability, the coefficient on this variable will be positive (i.e., long positions will be associated with price increases).
The C-M approach is more powerful than the nonparametric tests, and does not rely on the independence assumption. Of course, regression-based tests have the drawback of assuming normality of forecast errors. As neither approach is a priori superior, we conducted both the H-M nonparametric and C-M regression-based tests.
c. Search Account
In addition to these measures of interday performance, a "search account" was constructed in attempt to measure companies' abilities to find "good deals" in a market with no open outcry, and non-instantaneous dissemination of information.
In the absence of a normal-backwardation rationale for their presence in the market, traders that neither produce nor consume the commodity could survive by making trading profits through the ability to locate and take advantage of bargains faster than other types of companies. 23 22 If traders use technical analysis in taking positions (e.g., filter rules), then the independence assumption will be violated. For example. decisions based on troughs or peaks could lead to many small gains and a few big losses (or conversely), resulting in frequency-based tests, such as H-M's. giving misleading results.
23 The imperfect correlation between prices of Brent and WTI noted above implies that information-gathering in the forward market requires more than merely watching futures prices. Clearly. search-account gains and losses can result from intraday price fluctuation as well as differing abilities to find "good deals." Unfortunately. the DETERMINANTS OF TRADING PER~RMANCE, page 14
For each forward-contract maturity, we calculate for each day an average price, based on all transactions in that maturity (unweighted; recall that transaction size is standardised). Each transaction that takes place above the average price results in a gain, equal to the difference from the average, being posted to the seller and a similar loss to the buyer, with analogous calculations for transactions taking place below the average price.
To construct each trader-type's search account each day, the gains and losses associated with individual transactions must be aggregated. Since these gains and losses are themselves estimated as the difference between the price associated with the individual transaction and the average price for all transactions of the relevant contract maturity, the standard error of estimate will differ between transactions of different contract maturities, so that constructing the search account via an unweighted average would be inappropriate.
In constructing the account, each gain or loss for the given trader-type was weighted by the inverse of the estimated variance of prices for the contract on which the gain or loss was incurred. In equation form, each trader-type's searchaccount performance on day t was calculated as a weighted sum, Sjt:
where the time subscript is suppressed for clarity on the RHS, m indexes contract maturity, i indexes transact ions by the jth trader type in the m th contract exact time of each transaction is unavailable. Even when prices tend to rise or fall throughout the day, unless some types of companies systematically trade earlier in the day when prices are rising, or later in the day when prices are falling, the effects of intraday price variation will tend to cancel.
DETERMINANTS OF TRADING PER~RMANCE, page 15 maturity, and the summations are over i and m. The jth trader's gain or loss associated with each of its transactions is Smij = (P mij -Pm)Imij' where P mij is the transaction price, Pm is the average price across all transactions of the relevant contract maturity and I is an indicator variable, equal to one for sales and negative one for purchases. W m is the weight, n j the number of transactions by the trader-type for the day, and u~the variance of the estimated gain or loss on the transaction. 24 The variance is estimated from all the transactions by all traders in the given contract maturity on day t.
The daily search account represents an estimate of a trader-type's ability to do better than the average of all traders. To assess the statistical significance of the estimate, a standard error must be calculated:
where the variables and summation are as before, and the time subscript is again suppressed on the RHS. The same procedure serves to generate the search account for any time period. The daily search accounts are aggregated with weights as in (2), with the weights now being the daily variances that were calculated through (3) . Table 2B presents the holding account totals aggregated by whether trader-types are potential hedgers--i.e., possess production or consumption capacity. The 25Table 3A below provides an analogous indication of trader size in terms of total trading volume (i.e., flow of contracts signed). DETERMINANTS OF TRADING PERfORMANCE, page 17 leftmost five columns of Table 2A fall into this category; the remaining four columns represent trading companies--traders with no production or consumption to hedge--who are the speculators in this market. The table also presents figures with the Wall Street banks included in the hedger category, because this group sells hedging services to companies that engage in production or consumption of the physical commodity, often through tailored long-term commodity swaps.
IV. Holding Account: Results
Over the entire period, no trader-type posted a gain or loss that is significant at the 10% level, nor did the hedgers as a group, whether or not the Wall Street banks are included. Of course, the speculators (however defined) also broke even on the holding account, since their balances are just those of the hedgers with the signs reversed.
The holding accounts were also constructed for each trader-type for each six-month period from 1983:2 to 1989:2. 26 The subperiod breakdowns are calculated because the market has evolved over time. Some subperiods have witnessed sharp price fluctuations, while others have been calm. 27 The normal-backwardation hypothesis predicts that the insurance premium paid by hedgers to speculators for taking on risk will be greater in periods of higher volatility. Thus, hedgers should register larger holding-account losses during these periods. 26periods start in January and July. No correction for seasonality was made; Dominguez (1991) examined returns on WTI crude oil futures contracts over this period, finding no evidence of seasonality in returns. The same result was obtained for WTI spot prices by Garbade (1991) . 
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Of the 101 subperiod balances (13 subperiods for 8 trader-typ es, less 3 cases where a trader-typ e was inactive for a subperiod) , only two were statistica lly significan t at the 5% (and three at the 10%) level (two-taile d test), fewer than the number expected by chance. When the accounts were aggregated by whether trader-typ es are potential hedgers, not one of the 13 subperiod figures for hedger and speculator profits differed statistica lly from zero at the 1~signif icance 1eve1. 28 Following Bessembind er (1992), we also constructe d the holding account balances conditiona l on the potential hedgers' being net long and net short as a group.
Whereas Bessembin der, relying on CFTC data, finds that futures contracts tend to have higher returns when hedgers are net short than net long, our conditiona l holding-ac count balances, like the unconditio nal balances reported above, do not differ" from zero for any trader-typ e at convention al significan ce levels. We performed a modified version of Bessembin der's tests, taking advantage of our ability to distinguis h commercia ls' and noncommer cia1s' transactio ns. The daily holding-ac count balances of the "potential hedgers" group (see Table 2B ) were 28Because the subperiod balances are all null. they are omitted here in the interests of space. Tables with these figures are available in the working paper version of this article (Phillips and Weiner 1991) .
· '-DETERMINANTS OF TRADING PERFORMANCE, page 19 regressed against the estimated standard deviation of returns on futures contracts and an indicator variable for the sign of this group's net position: (4) where the summation is over the commercial trader types, u is the standard deviation of returns on futures contracts (estimated from historical data, and from implied volatility, backed out of options on NYMEX futures contracts), and I is the indicator variable (I t = -1 if net short on day t, 1 if net long, 0 if :ither). Consistent with our findings above, the estimated coefficients a,~, and 1 did not differ from zero at the 5% significance level. Estimation of (4) separately for each trader-type produced similarly insignificant results.
These tests differ from Bessembinder's in two important ways. First, we employ holding-account profits, rather than rates of return, as our dependent variable.
Recall that for forward contracts, no capital is invested, so that rates of return are not meaningful. Our holding account measures, like Bessembinder's rates of return, will vary with futures prices. Second, u here is a measure of total, rather than residual risk. Given our findings of insignificant gains and losses above, we have not performed the extensive asset-pricing tests necessary to decompose u into the systematic and residual components necessary to test directly Hirshleifer's proposed form of hedging interaction with residual risk. 29 Note that these modifications limit the comparability of these tests with Bessembinder's. The H-M nonparametric tests are unable to detect forecasting ability among any of the nine trader-types at conventional significance levels; the smallest p-value is 0.39. Five of the nine types perform worse than a trader guessing randomly, although the differences are not significant at conventional levels. 3o An examination of the subperiod results reveals evidence of forecasting ability (i.e., the sum of the conditional probabilities exceeded one at the 10% significance level) in only three (out of 114) cases.
As a check on whether our results are due to low power of the nonparametric approach, we also performed the C-M regression-based tests described earlier.
Changes in the futures price were regressed on a constant and a dummy variable that indicated whether the given trader was long or short on a given day. In only one of the nine cases (type E) did a trader-type's position have explanatory power at the 10% level. This case had the "wrong" sign; prices tended to fall when producers were 10ng. 31 Thus the regression-based tests yield results consistent with the earlier conclusions of no interday forecasting ability. 30For space reasons, only an illustrative matrix (for type Il is shown here. Full results are presented in the appendix. The matrix indicates the number of days on which long or short positions were held, and the number of days on which the one-month futures price rose or fell. Also indicated are the sum of the conditional probabilities of being on the right side of the market, given that it has risen and fallen, respectively, and the probability that this sum differs from one, its expected value if positions were chosen randomly. The figur es for the thirte en subpe riods vary some, but are large ly consi stent with the aggre gate resul ts. The shosh a made a profi t every perio d (exce pt 1983: 2, when they had a minus cule nine trans actio ns). Other tradin g compa nies lost in ten out of the thirte en perio ds. The Wall Stree t Banks lost money in all but two of the perio ds they were activ e (in one of the two, 1984: 2, they had but 2 trans actio ns), as did refin ers. The unide ntifie d group lost money every perio d.
31Altho ugh produce rs were net short in every six-mon th period. they were net long on 342 of the 1398 trading days in which they held a positio n. 
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Note also that the magnitude of the gains and losses diminishes toward the end of the period. As noted above, futures trading in Brent crude oil was successfully introduced in the second half of 1988. With instantaneous dissemination of information available, the degree of information asymmetry among market particiants should have decreased, leading to smaller magnitudes on the search account.
This result too is consistent with information-based views of trader performance.
When the search account figures are aggregated into hedger and speculator categories (as in Table 2 above), the majors' profits are more than large enough to offset the losses of the other hedgers. This yields a profit over the entire period for the group of $4.5 million (and hence, a loss for the speculators) that is significant at conventional levels (standard error $2.2 million) when type Wis 
718
-667 835
-547 429
Note: Totals and standard errors in thousands of dollars.
Sign convention: + indicates that the row made money off the column; -indicates the converse.
Significance levels (2-tailed test): a -lOX, b -5X DETERMINANTS OF TRADING PERFeRMANCE, page 26 not make significant gains or losses over the entire period are included (not shown here, available upon request), the results suggest that the winners in Table   3A gained at the expense of the types that lost overall, rather than at the expense of all other groups. The fact that the types that profited overall (M and~) did not incur significant losses to any of the other types, and the types that lost overall (I,M, and W) did not succeed at the expense of any of the other groups suggests the presence of an informational ordering. The groups with superior information gained at the expense of those with inferior information. In contrast, had it been the case that type A gained at the expense of type B, which gained at the expense of type C, which in turn gained at the expense of type A, then arguments based on informational asymmetry would have been difficult to make.
An alternative explanation to asymmetric information for the disparate performance of the various trader-types is default risk. Perhaps the finding that speculator groups tend to do badly reflects a "default risk premium" associated with their creditworthiness. Entry into speculation in this market requires far less capital than entry into refining or undersea oil production. In the absence of a DETERMINANTS OF TRADING PER~RMANCE, page 27 clearinghouse and the daily posting of margins to protect against default risk ("marking-to-market"), a large enough paper loss might leave lightly capitalised traders unable to fulfill their contractual obligations.
To investigate the possibility that our results -arise from differential default risk, rather than asymmetric information, we examined incentives to default among lightly-capitalised trading companies, assigning all the transactions among hedgers to a "low-risk" group, and transactions between hedgers and speculators, to a "high-risk" group. For each transaction, we computed a measure of the incentive to default by assuming that traders could walk away from their contractual obligations cost1ess1y. Cost1ess default can be modeled as an implicit option in the forward contract. The incentive to default on each contTact was estimated by using standard techniques to value an implicit put option for the seller and an implicit call option for the buyer when the contract was signed. 32 When the values of the default option are compared between groups for each contract maturity in each subperiod, the differences are almost all economically and statistically insignificant. 33 Given that these option values overestimate the incentive to default, by assuming that default is costless, we conclude that differences in default-risk premia cannot explain our search-account results.
32The Black-Scholes option valuation formula was used. with price volatility estimated from historical futures prices (supplemented by implicit volatility estimates from crude oil options prices from the start of options trading in 1986). Since we are comparing values between groups, any errors arising from the appropriateness of the Black-Scholes formula's assumptions should be at most second order. See Phillips and Weiner (1990) for further discussion.
330f the 40 differences (13 subperiods. each with an average of about 3 contract maturities with enough observations to compute standard errors) between the "low risk" and "high risk" groups in mean default-option value, only 3 were significant at the 5% level (one-tailed test), and one of these had the wrong sign. Threefourths of these differences were less than $0.01 per barrel; the maximum difference over all subperiods and contract maturities was only $0.14 per barrel. in comparison with a typical contract price of $20 per barrel.
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Our finding of no significant profits or losses on the holding (interday) account does not support the theory of normal backwardation, because hedgers do not pay for, and speculators do not receive, fees for insurance provision. Such a result is stronger here than in a futures market, because entry into speculation in the Brent forward market is limited by the large transaction size and absence of a clearinghouse and right to close out positions automatically through offsetting transactions, implying the necessity to be able to operate in the cash market. If the risk premia predicted by normal-backwardation are not present here, they are even less likely to be found in a futures market, where ease of entry into speculation tends to reduce or eliminate speculators' returns to bearing risk.
The absence of significant profits, and the lack of forecasting ability, however, are also inconsistent with views based on asymmetric information from one day to the next. These results differ from those of previous researchers, who have found support for the normal-backwardation theory) in one case (Chang 1985) , and that hedgers actually made mon(y on what we term the holding account in another (Hartzmark 1987) .34
In analysing performance based on individual transactions, we find evidence supportive of the asymmetric-information view of forward and futures markets. The major oil companies posted significant profits. This finding is not entirely
. surprising, as the majors operate the Brent delivery system, which implies deciding on how many cargoes will be lifted each month, as well as when during the 34An alternative explanation for our results is that both asymmetric information and normal backwardation hold in this market, and just happen to cancel, explaining the insignificant results obtained above on the holding account. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility.
DETERMINANTS OF TRADING PERfBRMANCE, page 29 month each producing company's oil will be 1ifted. 35 The majors also produce the bulk of the oil in the Brent fields, as suggested by the fact that they hold most of the net short position, as can be seen in Table 2A . If any group is likely to have access to more information than the others, it is the majors. It appears, however, that the value of this information does not extend beyond the end of the trading day. As noted above, this result is consistent with the time pattern of information dissemination in this market--dea1s made during the day are widely reported only at day's end.
We can gain insight into trader heterogeneity by comparing the performance of our four types of trading companies. 36 Of the four speculator groups, three posted significant losses; only the Japanese trading houses posted the gains predicted by the view that the trading companies' advantage lies in gathering and interpreting information rapidly. Of the losers, the easiest to explain is the "unidentified" group of traders, who are the most likely to have inferior information. The very fact of being assigned to this category indicates that a company is not in the market often enough to be known to the market surveyors. That this group lost money every period is also supportive of an intraday asymmetric-information view.
35The oil is in common pools under the North Sea, with property rights determined by the fraction of the field owned by each producer. Delivery takes place through lifting the oil from undersea pipelines to the loading platform, and then to the tanker. Lifting schedules are decided upon a month in advance. Accounts in the trade press suggest that the supply is price-inelastic, but fluctuates from month to month for a variety of reasons (primarily weather-and maintenance-related) not directly related to oil prices. For an example of how decisions regarding the market can affect prices, see the trade paper Weekly Petroleum Argus (1993, p.12) : "The announcement of a 55 cargo July Brent programme, 17 cargoes more than in June and on the high end of market expectations, exacerbated the already bearish mood." 36The shosha historically have handled a large fraction of Japanese exports and imports. The expertise of the Wall Street banks, which have included Bear Stearns, Chase Manhattan, Drexel, J. Aron (Goldman Sachs), and Morgan Stanley, is in financial deals. Other trading companies arose primarily from within the oil industry, from the transport and trading divisions of the majors and large integrated companies. The unidentified category, comprising occasional market participants, also consists of trading companies, as it is unlikely to include finms with production or refining capacity.
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Explaining the performance of the Wall Street banks is more difficult. It is possible that the fees they collected from the clients on whose behalf they trade were more than enough to offset the $3.6 million they lost on the search account.
The diversity of traders' experiences suggests that lumping them together as "speculators," or "non-commercials," as in the CFTC reporting system, is not useful for the purpose of economic analysis, and likely to obscure more than it reveals regarding trading performance. Our results also suggest that differential default risk does not account for the diversity of trader performance. Explaining this diversity remains an unanswered question, and a subject for future investigation.
